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Abstract 
 
The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) is a 
cipher adopted by the National Institute of Standards 
and Technology (NIST) to secure classified United 
States (US) digital government documents. A cipher 
is an algorithm that converts information (plaintext) 
to unreadable (ciphertext) form and vice-versa. The 
AES has also been employed in other areas such as 
to secure information in smart cards and online 
transactions. This year marks the fifth year that the 
AES has been adopted as a standard. During that 
period, many attacks have been performed on the 
cipher. However, none have fully broken the 
complete round cipher. All of the attacks were 
launched on reduced-round version and the 
complexity is compared to that of brute force. Brute 
force is an attack that tries every possible value of 
the key of the cipher. Therefore, it serves as the 
upper bound on the attack on block ciphers. In this 
paper, we will review some existing cryptanalytic 
attacks on AES. 
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1 Introduction 
 
Cryptology is concerned with the making 
(cryptography) and breaking (cryptanalysis) of 
schemes that provide certain security services 
(confidentiality, integrity, authenticity etc.). The 
schemes contribute significantly to the practical and 
intellectual underpinnings for communications 
security [8].  
Cryptography is a science of protecting 
information by encryption and decryption using a 
key. Encryption is the process of converting 
information from readable to unreadable format. The 
message prior to the encryption process is called the 
plaintext while the scrambled data after the 
encryption is called the ciphertext. The plaintext can 
be recovered from the plaintext with a decryption 
process using a key. The algorithm that can perform 
encryption and decryption is called a cipher. 
A cipher is categorized into symmetric and 
asymmetric algorithms. The former uses the same 
key for encryption and decryption while the latter 
employs different key for both operations. A 
symmetric cipher can be further classified into block 
and stream cipher. A block cipher operates on blocks 
of data and a stream cipher works on one bit at a 
time. 
Cryptanalysis is the opposite of cryptography. 
The field deals with the uncovering of encrypted 
messages without initial knowledge of the key used 
in the encryption process. 
In 1997, NIST spearheaded an effort to replace 
the Data Encryption Standard (DES) [26], which is 
to be called the AES [27]. After some evaluation 
processes, the Rijndael [11] cipher was selected as 
the AES from fifteen candidates in 2000.  
This paper aims to review existing attacks on 
AES and highlights some potential future works. 
Section 2.0 gives an introduction to the AES and 
some basic concepts of cryptanalysis is given in 
section 3.0. Section 4.0 reviews existing attacks on 
AES. Further research is suggested in section 5.0 
and section 6.0 concludes the paper. 
 
 
2 Advanced Encryption Standard 
 
The AES [27] is a 128-bit block cipher with key 
lengths of 128 (denoted AES-128), 192 (AES-192) 
and 256 bits (AES-256). For AES-128, the cipher 
uses 10 rounds, 12 rounds for AES-192 and 14 
rounds for AES-256. The 128-bit data block can be 
illustrated as a 4x4 byte matrix as shown in Figure 1. 
The indices of byte s represent the row and column 
of each byte. Each round except for the last consists 
of four transformations namely SubBytes, 
ShiftRows, MixColumns and AddRoundKey. 
SubBytes simply substitutes one byte to another 
byte, ShiftRows cyclically shifts the rows of the 
state over different offsets, MixColumns is a linear 
transformation of all four bytes in the same column 
and KeyAddition is an exclusive-OR (XOR) 
operation of the current data block with the round 
key. The last round omits the MixColumns 
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transformation and the first round is preceded with 
an AddRoundKey. 
 
0,0s  0,1s  0,2s  0,3s  
1,0s  1,1s  1,2s  1,3s  
2,0s  2,1s  2,2s  2,3s  
3,0s  3,1s  3,2s  3,3s  
Figure 1: A 4x4 data block of the AES 
 
 
3 Cryptanalysis 
 
This section introduces some basic concepts on the 
cryptanalysis of a block cipher. 
The attacks performed on block ciphers is based 
on a threat model called Kerckhoff’s assumption 
[18] whereby the attacker knows all the details of the 
cipher except the secret key. Based on this 
assumption, attacks are classified according to 
adversary’s capabilities: 
• Ciphertext-only: a passive attack whereby an 
adversary is assumed to possess a set of 
ciphertext to recover the plaintext of secret key. 
• Known plaintext: a passive attack whereby an 
adversary knows some plaintext-ciphertext pairs 
to find the unknown portion of the plaintext or 
secret key. 
• Chosen plaintext: an active attack whereby an 
adversary has the ability to choose plaintexts 
and obtained the corresponding ciphertexts. 
• Chosen ciphertext: an active attack whereby an 
adversary has the ability to choose ciphertexts 
and obtained the corresponding plaintexts. 
• Related-key: an adversary is assumed to choose 
some relation between the secret key used in 
encryption and decryption, but not the value of 
the key. 
A cipher vulnerable to a ciphertext-only attack 
is considered weak [16] while a cipher which is 
secure against a chosen ciphertext attack is deemed 
secure [21]. 
Attacks can also be classified based on the 
required effort that the adversary needs to solve: 
• Brute-force: in this attack, every possible value 
of the key is tried until the plaintext is 
recognized. The attack is also called an 
exhaustive key search. 
• Shortcut attacks: an attack that has the 
complexity less than that of brute-force. 
• Side channel attacks: an attack based on 
information obtained from physical 
implementation of a cipher. 
• Fault analysis: an attack based on systematically 
inducing faults in particular hardware 
components used to protect or to store keys or 
algorithms. 
This paper focuses on shortcut attacks. 
Attacking a cipher does not necessarily mean to 
find the secret key. Based on recovered information, 
Knudsen [19] described a hierarchical classification 
of the outcomes of an attack: 
• Total break: an adversary recovers the secret 
key. 
• Global deduction: an adversary discovers an 
algorithm which is functionally equivalent to 
the encryption and decryption process without 
knowledge of the key. 
• Instance (local) deduction: an adversary 
recovers the plaintext (or ciphertext) from an 
intercepted ciphertext (or plaintext) which was 
not acquired from the legitimate sender. 
• Information deduction: an adversary obtains 
information about the secret key, plaintexts or 
ciphertexts which was not directly came from 
the legitimate sender and which was not known 
before the attack. 
• Distinguishing algorithm: an attacker is able to 
tell whether the attacked cipher is a randomly 
chosen permutation or one of the 2k 
permutations indicated by the secret key. 
The success of an attack can be measured by its 
complexity as follows: 
• Data complexity: the amount of data (plaintexts 
or ciphertexts) required to execute the attack 
under a certain threat model. 
• Time complexity: the number of encryption / 
decryption needed to perform the attack. 
• Memory complexity: the amount of memory 
needed to hold all data during the attack. 
• Success probability: measures the frequency of 
a successful attack when repeated in a number 
of times. 
 
3.1 Differential and Linear Cryptanalysis 
 
Two most prominent attacks [29] on block ciphers 
are linear [24] and differential cryptanalysis [3]. 
This section briefly explains the gist of the attacks. 
Differential cryptanalysis was discovered by 
Israeli researchers Eli Biham and Adi Shamir [3]. It 
is a chosen-plaintext attack that relies on the idea 
that a fixed input difference may, with high 
probability, generate a particular output difference. 
By encrypting pairs of plaintexts with prescribed 
bitwise difference, and seeing which key bits are 
suggested by the output difference, key bits are 
determined. As we will see in the following sections, 
the majority of attacks are based on the concept of 
differential cryptanalysis. 
A few years later, Mitsuru Matsui introduced 
the concept of linear cryptanalysis [24]. The attack 
works by finding linear relationship between 
plaintext, ciphertext and key bits that reveal 
information about the key. Later, Matsui improved 
Proceedings of the Postgraduate Annual Research Seminar 2006 98
the attack and performed the cryptanalysis on DES 
[25]. It is a known-plaintext attack and seeks to find 
a linear approximate expression of a given 
cryptographic algorithm. 
 
 
4 Attacks on AES 
 
This section gives brief reviews on existing attacks 
on AES. The general idea of the attack is presented 
along with the complexities of the attacks. The 
interested reader is advised to read the referred paper 
for a more detail treatment of the attacks. 
 
4.1 Square Attack 
 
The square attack is originally a dedicated attack on 
a block cipher with the same name [10]. Because 
AES inherits some of the properties of the square 
cipher, therefore the attack also applies to AES. The 
attack has also been called the saturation [23], 
integral [20] and structural / multiset [6] attacks. 
The attack works by observing the propagation 
of the XOR for a set of plaintext called a Λ -set. A 
-set is a set of 256 plaintexts that are all different 
in some of the bytes and equal in all other bytes. The 
basic attack can be applied to AES reduced to four 
rounds. The attack can be extended by adding a 
round at the end and at the beginning of the cipher 
for a total of six rounds. Some key values for the 
initial round, fifth and sixth round are then guessed 
until the required criterion is met. 
Λ
The six-round attack requires 232 chosen 
plaintext or 272 cipher executions while the memory 
complexity is 232. In [13], Ferguson et al. reduce the 
work factor of the six-round attack to 244 cipher 
executions and the number of chosen plaintext 
needed is 235. The authors use a technique called 
partial sum to improve the complexity of the attack. 
A further extension of the attack is also described by 
the authors. For a seven-round attack, 2128 – 2119 
chosen plaintexts are required which is comparable 
to 2120 encryptions. 
Lucks [22] extended the square attack to cover 
seven rounds of AES. For AES-192, the nature of its 
key schedule allows the author to attack AES 
reduced to seven rounds using 232 chosen plaintexts 
which is equivalent to 2184 of time complexity. The 
attack on AES-256 requires the same amount of 
chosen plaintext but the time complexity increases to 
2200. 
Therefore, the best attack on AES based on the 
square attack is using the partial sum technique. The 
attack successfully penetrates seven out of ten 
rounds of AES-128, up to eight (out of 12) rounds of 
AES-192 and nine (out of 14) rounds of AES-256. 
These numbers make up 70% of the AES-128, 68% 
of AES-192 and 64% AES-256. 
 
4.2 Collision Attack 
 
The square attack is based on the fact that three 
rounds of AES can be distinguished from a random 
permutation. Gilbert and Minier [14] devised an 
attack which could distinguish a four-round AES 
from a random permutation. They exploit the 
existence of collisions between some partial 
functions induced by the cipher. The distinguisher 
allows them to attack AES reduced to seven rounds 
which requires 232 chosen plaintexts and a 
complexity of about 2140. A variant of the attack on 
AES-128 results in a much lower complexity and 
faster than brute force. 
 
4.3 Impossible Differential 
 
Impossible differential is an attack that exploits on 
the behaviour of the MixColumns transformation. If 
we have a pair of plaintext which differs only in one 
byte, then the ciphertext in AES reduced to four 
rounds can not be the same in the following byte 
positions: {(0,0), (1,3), (2,2), (3,1)}, {(0,1), (1,0), 
(2,3), (3,2)}, {(0,2), (1,1), (2,0), (3,3)} nor {(0,3), 
(1,2), (2,1), (3,0)}. Wrong key bytes are eliminated 
if the impossible event occurs. 
The attack was first presented on the AES-128 
reduced to five rounds by Biham and Keller [2]. 
This was later improved by Cheon et al [7] to cover 
six rounds using 291.5 chosen plaintexts and a time 
complexity of 2122. For AES-192 and AES-256, 
Phan [28] managed to attack the cipher reduced to 
seven rounds. The attack requires 292 (AES-192) and 
292.5 (AES-256) chosen plaintexts with time 
complexities of 2186 (AES-192) and 2250.5 (AES-
256). 
Currently, the best impossible differential attack 
penetrates AES-128 up to six rounds. Fro both AES-
192 and AES-256, the best attack so far manages to 
break through seven rounds. 
 
4.4 Boomerang 
 
The boomerang attack [30] is an adaptive chosen 
plaintext and ciphertext attack which is an extension 
to differential cryptanalysis. The attack works by 
breaking the cipher into two parts and a differential 
is used in each part. These two differentials are later 
joined to suggest an adaptive chosen plaintext and 
ciphertext property of the algorithm that has high 
probability. 
The attack on AES reduced to five and six 
rounds has data complexity of 239 and 271 
respectively [4]. The total workload or time 
complexity of the attack is set at 239 and 271 for each 
reduced round. 
We have not found other variants of this attack 
on the AES. Hence, this is the best boomerang attack 
on the cipher. 
 
4.6 Impossible Related-Key Differential 
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The related key attack [1] is an attack that exploits 
the key scheduling of a cipher. Obvious relationship 
between the keys enables the attack to be mounted 
on weak key schedules. The attack observes the 
behaviour of a cipher by using different but related 
keys. This attack is independent of the number of 
rounds and the inner structure of a cipher. By 
combining this attack with impossible differential 
cryptanalysis, an impossible related-key differential 
attack is mounted on AES-192 [15]. 
The attack is able to penetrate up to seven 
rounds of AES using 2111 plaintext/ciphertext pairs 
with time complexity of 2116. On the other hand, the 
time complexity of the attack on eight-round AES is 
2183 and requires 288 plaintext/ciphertext pairs. 
 
4.7 Algebraic Attacks 
 
Another recent attack is those which focused on the 
algebraic structure within the AES. The attacks are 
algebraic in nature, rather than statistical. The 
attacks rely on analyzing the internals of a cipher 
and deriving a system of quadratic simultaneous 
equations. These systems of equations are typically 
very large, for example 8000 equations with 1600 
variables for the 128-bit AES. Several methods for 
solving such systems are known. In the eXtended 
Sparse Linearization (XSL) attack [9], a specialized 
algorithm is then applied to solve these equations 
and recover the key. 
Another attack in this category is the 
interpolation attack [17]. The attack constructs 
polynomials from plaintext and ciphertext pairs. If 
the components of a cipher have a compact algebraic 
expression, then the expressions can be combined to 
represent the entire cipher. If the expression of the 
ciphertext as a polynomial of the plaintext has a 
manageable complexity i.e. low degree, then the 
coefficients of this polynomial can be determined 
with a small amount of plaintext/ciphertext pairs. 
The Lagrange interpolation formula is used to 
determine the coefficients of the polynomial. 
However, the threat posed by algebraic attacks 
on AES is difficult to quantify [12] and it is unclear 
whether the attack should be regarded as a serious 
security threat [31]. Therefore, more research should 
be put into this area. 
Table 1 shows the summary of the attacks on 
AES. 
 
Table 1: Summary of attacks on the AES 
Attack Key size No. of 
rounds 
Data 
complexity 
Time 
complexity 
Memory 
Square [] All 6 232 272 232
Partial sum [] All 6 6× 232 244 232
Partial sum [] 192 7 19×232 2155 232
Partial sum [] 256 7 21×232 2172 232
Partial sum [] All 7 2128 -  2119 2120 264
Partial sum [] 192 8 2128 -  2119 2188  
Partial sum [] 256 8 2128 -  2119 2204  
Partial sum [] 256 9 285 2224  
Square (Lucks) [] 192 7 232 2184 232
Square (Lucks) [] 256 7 232 2200 232
Collision [] 192 7 232 2140 232
Collision [] 256 7 232 2192 232
Impossible differential [Biham] 128 5 229.5 231 242
Impossible differential [Cheon] 128 6 291.5 2122 289
Impossible differential [phan] 192 7 292 2186 2153
Impossible differential [phan] 256 7 292.5 2250.5 2153
Boomerang [Biryukov] 128 5 239 239 233
Boomerang [Biryukov] 128 6 271 271 233
Impossible related-key differential 192 7 2111 2116  
Impossible related-key differential 192 8 288 2183  
 
5 Further Research  
 
According to [20], square can be combined with the 
interpolation attack. Other than that, as of late, a 
breed of hybrid of new attacks has emerged, which 
combines existing attacks to form new attacks. 
Therefore, there are plenty of rooms to make further 
research. Ferguson et. al [13]  note that there are 
many ways in which variations on their attack can be 
made, such as using a different key difference 
pattern or applying the partial-sum technique further 
to reduce the workload. For boomerang attack, the 
author states the possibility of the attack to penetrate 
seven rounds of AES-192. Other than that, the 
middle-round gaining trick used to attack Safer+ [5] 
might also be used to attack the AES. 
 
6 Conclusion 
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Currently, the best attack on AES-128 is the partial 
sum technique which is able to cryptanalyze the 
cipher reduced to seven rounds. For AES-192 and 
AES-256, the same technique is the best attack 
which penetrates eight and nine rounds respectively. 
Therefore, three more rounds are needed to reach the 
maximum round of AES-128. Meanwhile, for AES-
192 and AES-256, another four and five rounds each 
are required. All of the authors claimed that their 
attacks do not posed a serious threat to AES because 
most of the attacks are impractical (requires huge 
amount of data or memory). The results show 
certificational attacks that worked on the cipher and 
any attack which is faster than brute force is 
considered a shortcut attack. [Lucks]. We also look 
into some further extensions of the attack presented 
in this paper. The minimum size of key for AES is 
128 bits prohibits an exhaustive key search on the 
cipher with current technologies. However, with the 
emergence of quantum cryptology, the time required 
to perform brute-force attack on a cipher might be 
shorten. DES managed to stay as a standard for 
nearly 30 years and AES is expected to exceed, if 
not match the period. Only time will tell whether the 
AES is able to stand the test of time or not. 
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